Jubilee Campaign led a group of delegates from Plateau State met with the International Criminal Court on May 14, 2012 to discuss the Report on Preliminary Examinations released last December.
At the meeting Jubilee Campaign submitted following analysis of the report.
ANALYSIS OF THE NIGERIA SECTION OF THE REPORT ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION ACTIVITIES SUBMITTED BY THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR TO THE ASSEMBLY OF STATES PARTIES (ASP) ON 13 DECEMBER 2011
Jubilee Campaign hereby raises five points of concern regarding the summary of issues and the examples used within the Office of the Prosecutor’s Report on Preliminary Examination Activities. We thank the Office of the Prosecutor for their willingness to meet with us and engage with us regarding our observations. We offer the recommendation that the Office of the Chief Prosecutor distinguish more clearly the States where violence has occurred because the diversity of causes of the acts of violence are distinct. The Office should identify more clearly the known and self-declared perpetrators of acts of violence which will shift the focus to prosecution of the perpetrators thereby reducing impunity. We further recommend that the Office identify hindrances to full and effective prosecution of perpetrators as well as acknowledge where effective prosecutions have taken place.
Jubilee Campaign observes the following five assertions as objectionable due to these assertions either containing factual inaccuracies or mischaracterizations of the “Contextual Background”:
I. Naming only the Plateau State (paragraph 53) and Akwa Ibom State (paragraph 59) materially distorts the location of where the violence has occurred, conceals the source of the violence, and diverts attention from areas that have at least equal and at times larger groups of victims of violence.
By singling out “the Middle-Belt states” and “the Plateau State specifically” as experiencing “recurrent clashes”, the impression is to downplay if not utterly disregard the violence occurring within any of the northern states. Either all states experiencing violence should be mentioned or no states.
Identifying deaths occurring “in the Middle-Belt states in central and northern Nigeria,” without delineation of timeframe or of location implies that the causes of the violence are the same in these two distinct regions when they are not. Lack of distinguishing the violence which has occurred in the northern States also distorts the source of the violence in the northern states. Such an implication distorts the uncontested fact that the bulk of the violence in Nigeria occurring after the 2011 election  and in recent years has been in the northern states.
Further, the assertion that the deaths caused by inter-communal, sectarian and political violence are “unevenly distributed over time and place” if true supports the need for the Prosecutor to distinguish both the States where the violence has occurred, the distinctive causes, and the efforts to prosecute perpetrators. The highest concentration of the violence, especially the post-election violence referred to later in paragraph 59 was in twelve of the northern states of Nigeria.  The most recent upsurge of attacks made by the extremist group Boko Haram has been concentrated in northern states.
The report makes no specific mention of any particular northern state where violence has occurred, except when lumping the northern states in with the central Middle-Belt states as seen in paragraph 55: “The vast majority died in the Middle-Belt states in central and northern Nigeria in a series of major assaults along ethnic/sectarian lines by mobs or youth groups.” While serious incidents of violence have occurred in Jos, the majority of the violence occurred in twelve particular northern states, not the Middle-Belt states.  Indeed, ironically Plateau State was peaceful throughout the election period during which significant violence occurred in the north of the country. Also, the wording in paragraph 55 is confusing and leads to the interpretation that the “central and northern” states mentioned are only central and northern Middle-Belt states, not the core northern states in which violence actually occurred.
The report conceals the source of the violence by implying that the primary reason violent “clashes” have occurred in Nigeria is due to divisions between “indigene” and “settler” communities and ethnic differences, rather than any other causes such as the religious motivated attacks of Boko Haram. Jubilee Campaign’s interviews of IDPs confirm that religious beliefs, not ethnic divisions, have been the primary impetus behind violence.  The post-election violence interestingly occurred only in the twelve northern states that have enacted Sharia law against those who do not conform to Sharia law, demonstrating that religion is a primary force behind attacks.
Religion is supplanting ethnicity as the primary factor of identity.  While in the South, there is religious diversity within specific tribes, in the North tribes tend to be heavily dominated by either Christians or Muslims. Thus in many cases, religious tensions are between ethnicities, and to outside observers the tensions might appear to be primarily ethnic and only secondarily religious. However, in recent years, the tension between Muslims and Christians has broken down the tribal barriers, and discrimination against Christians has worsened regardless of ethnicity.
That religious identity is becoming increasingly more important than ethnic identity is shown in attacks carried out against members belonging to the same ethnic group as their attackers, making religion, not ethnicity, the primary reason for the brutal attacks. In Yobe, Christians were specifically targeted for attack, leading over 500 Christians from tribes indigenous to Yobe to flee to Christian enclaves in Jos and other parts of the Middle-Belt region. The leaders of these internally displaced persons (IDPs) said that about 3000 more IDPs had fled to other Christian enclaves in the Middle-Belt. Homes of Christians would be marked with graffiti during the day and then attacked at night. These house-to-house killings represent a severe escalation in ethnic cleansing tactics. Even more serious is the fact that these ethnic cleansing tactics are being used within one ethnic group to purge their religious minority. While in the past Christians have faced discrimination, indigenous groups would tend to unite around a common tribal identity. Now however, at least in Yobe, religious identity has supplanted ethnicity to the point that Muslims are engaging in ethnic cleansing tactics against Christian members of their own ethnic group. The IDPs themselves placed more emphasis on their religious identity than their ethnic identity because when interviewed, they identified themselves first as Christians and no one mentioned their tribe by name.
Religion has become a primary motivating factor as leaders in the northern states were voted in on the platform of Sharia law, created several Sharia courts which were supposed to be voluntary, as they lacked mandatory jurisdiction over individuals who did not claim to be Muslim. However, these Sharia courts frequently have stretched their powers beyond their limits and gained unconstitutional jurisdiction over non-Muslims who do not volunteer to be under their jurisdiction. Islamic police known as the “Hisbah” are funded by state governments in Bauchi, Zamfara, Niger, Kaduna, and Kano and enforce a number of Sharia laws against Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Extensive violence corresponded with the passage of Sharia laws and there were many casualties across the north, especially in Kaduna and Jos in 2000. Enactment of Sharia law put heavy pressure on Muslims who have Christian family members or friends to prove their allegiance to their Islamic faith over their family or ethnic ties.
In Adamawa which had both Christians and Muslims voting for both the losing party (C.P.C.) and the winning party (P.D.P.) in the election, only Christians were targeted for violence. This evidence points toward religious persecution rather than political unrest. If it had been politically motivated, all supporters of the P.D.P., both Christians and Muslims, would have been targeted in that state. Paragraph 55 further marginalizes the primacy of religion motivating violence in Nigeria by stating that “at least thousands of people died in Nigeria as a consequence of inter-communal, sectarian and political violence.” Not once is religiously-motivated violence mentioned, although the violence occurring in the northern states has been primarily motivated by religion, as can be seen by the Boko Haram, an Islamic extremist group, claiming responsibility for killing hundreds of Nigerians from the northern states explicitly in the name of their religion.  While “sectarian” could refer to conflict between religious groups, it could also refer to conflict between differing political, economic, and ideological groups, and no context is given in the text of the paragraph to influence one’s interpretation of “sectarian” as being conflict between religious groups, and thus its intended meaning in the report is unclear.
By not mentioning the post-election and the ongoing violence that has occurred in the twelve northern states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe, and Zamfara since 2011, the report diverts attention from the widest groups of victims of the violence—a full scale onslaught that was reminiscent of the Kenyan post-election violence. The hundreds of victims of violence in the core north are completely overlooked in the report. And further, that many of these victims were Christians is never mentioned in the report and thus, attention is diverted from the true nature of the violence and the people it affected.
II. Prominent attribution of the distinction between “indigenes” and “settlers” of a state with specific attribution in paragraph 53 to only the Plateau State for “recurrent clashes” is entirely disproportionate to the locations where violence has actually occurred in Nigeria and ignores and omits the significant efforts made by the Plateau State government to uphold Constitutional equality of indigenes and settlers, and also falsely attributes responsibility for the attacks on Christians.
The area around the city of Jos in Plateau State is the main area where the disputes between the “indigenes” and the “settlers” occur. But while there are many different types of “settlers” and several indigenous peoples living in Jos, the conflicts are never between indigenous Christians and indigenous Muslims or Christians and other settlers; conflict is primarily between the mostly Muslim Hausa-Fulani settlers and indigenous Christians.
It is also not accurate to assert that the “clashes” are between only “settlers” and “indigenes” in the Middle-Belt states because the Hausa-Fulani are the only “settlers” who cause violent outbreaks, both in Jos and in the other areas they have “settled.” The Hausa-Fulani hostility towards indigenes is especially prevalent in Jos because of the failed attempts of Hausa-Fulani Jihadists to take over Jos in 1873. There are other Nigerian citizens from other states who have settled in Plateau even before the Hausas and Fulanis but they have never had any crisis with the indigenes. Examples are the Urhobos, Yorubas and the Igbos. Indeed, the Yorubas even have a sizeable Muslim population, but these have had no problems with the ethnic Plateau people ever since. They instead have also suffered greatly in the attacks by the Hausas.
Moreover, in Jos, “settlers” are not discriminated against at a state level. The government of Plateau state and specifically Jos has been exerting significant effort to afford its citizens, both indigenes and settlers, Constitutional equality. Settlers are given full voting rights and government appointments in seats and positions that in other states, no one outside of the state would be allowed to hold. For example, there are fourteen electoral wards in Jos North Local Government Area. Of those fourteen, seven are dominated by Hausa/Fulani “settlers” and seven are dominated by Christian Berom “indigenes.” Not only do the “settlers” have an equal number of electoral wards, they actually have more representation than their indigene neighbors because the Hausa/Fulani dominated wards have fewer registered voters than the indigene electoral wards. The total number of registered voters in five Hausa dominated wards was 59,404 in 2009 while the total number of registered Christian voters in only one electoral ward was 72,202. This demonstrates that the Hausa/Fulani are not discriminated against by the government in choosing their leaders because they have more wards that the indigenes who have more registered voters, giving the Hausa/Fulani a distinct political advantage. Settlers have been allowed to run for office in Jos during previous elections. Also, “non-indigenes” are not discriminated against in being allowed to hold positions of authority in the government or local leadership.
Paragraph 52 and 53 imply that not only is the main reason behind the violence in Nigeria the indigene/settler disputes, but this is owing to the “particular nature” of the country The report conspicuously fails to note that far from being an arbitrary policy, that conceptual difference is a creation of the Federal Constitution of Nigeria which creates a distinction of ethnic groups being indigene or settlers. In addition, the indigene settler issue is not particular to Nigeria but is a common phenomenon across the continent and is a protected class (endangered indigenous peoples or tribes) even in Western countries.
Moreover, the use of the term “clash” implies that both sides are armed and attacking one another. The evidence shows that significant numbers of victims have been women and children villagers hacked to death by machete, shot in their beds in the night, or burnt alive in their homes or in churches. The use of the term “clash” is therefore offensive to the innocent and defenseless victims brutally slaughtered.
Further, the report mischaracterizes Christians as “attacking” their opponents when Christians have not been the aggressors. The specific finding in Paragraph 53, “As a result, Muslims and Christians from different ethnic groups have attacked their opponents, using religion as a tool to mobilize followers,” is profoundly inaccurate. The evidence shows that the members of some of the Christian communities under attack who have perpetrated violence did so in retaliation for the earlier attacks upon their community and did not use religion as a tool of aggression. For example in the report by the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Unrest of 28November 2008 in Jos, the committee states that “it becomes very clear that the immediate cause of the November 28 crisis in Jos North was the violent attack by the Huasa/Fulani Muslim youths on the people and against the properties of the people they perceived as their opponents.” The Judicial Commission further found that the opponents of the Muslim youth reacted in “self- defence,” engulfing the city in unrest.
On a final note, of all the 36 states with a potential for indigene/settler divides, it is only in one that it has been blown out of proportion. The mega-city of Lagos which attracted millions from all regions of the country due to rural-urban drift and its stature as the former national capital has not witnessed violent agitation for “indigeneship” rights by settlers. It is therefore curious that Plateau is singled out when none of these rights have been made an issue in any other states. In fact, ironically indigenes of the core northern states who are not Muslims are themselves marginalized and persecuted by their own people on this basis only.
III. The one example given in paragraph 59 of the 2011 post-election violence in the southern “Akwa Ibom State” is factually inaccurate because it references an incident which occurred in Akwa Ibom State that was in fact pre-election violence and intra-party, and which was the only incident of election violence in any southern state; moreover, the incidents of election related violence which occurred in 2003 and 2007 were of an entirely different nature then the post-election 2011 violence which entailed large scale and random targeting of moderate Muslims, Christians and churches in the north.
All of the 2011 post-election violence occurred in the northern states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe, and Zamfara. Paragraphs 54 and 59 are highly misleading in diverting attention away from the northern states where the post-election violence occurred. By listing only one specific incidence of violence relating to the 2011 elections as being the only instance of pre-election violence in the south (which had only that one incident, constituting the entirety of violence experienced during pre- and post-election) instead of the north (where all the post-election violence occurred), paragraph 59 severely distorts the facts and circumstances surrounding the 2011 election and completely skirts around the issue of post-election violence occurring exclusively in the core northern states.
Naming only one pre-election violence incident in the south while referencing the pre- and post-election violence across Nigeria generally is a gross misrepresentation that ignores the reality of widespread violence in Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe, and Zamfara states after the 2011 elections and implies that the levels and type of violence experienced by Nigeria after each election of 2003, 2007, and 2011 was identical when the post-election violence of 2011 was vastly different than that of the 2003 and 2007 elections. Christians in these twelve northern states were attacked after the general elections in April, 2011, but this was not the case in 2003 and 2007.
In the post-election violence of 2011, mobs of Muslim rioters all across the 12 northern Sharia states targeted Christians and caused massive loss of human life, church property, and individual property and private businesses. The level of attacks on federal government property is infinitesimal compared to the destruction unleashed on private citizens. During the attack, many people were beaten and raped. Almost 1,000 people were killed—some were burnt alive, others were killed with machetes and then set on fire. Hundreds of churches and their pastoriums were looted, vandalized, and set on fire. Christian schools and clinics were targeted in the same manner. Thousands of homes and businesses owned by Christians were also looted, vandalized or set on fire. Vehicles including bicycles, motorcycles, cars, and buses were stolen, vandalized, or completely burnt. Money and other types of personal property belonging to Christians were also looted, damaged, or completely destroyed.
The omission of specific locations as well as any mention of the northern states affected by the prevalent post-election violence seems deliberately aimed to obfuscate issues. The report should delineate specific locations, and clarify that there was no post-election violence in Plateau State. The report should also further distinguish between the scale of violence and the type of violence experienced in the 2003 and 2007 elections versus that unleashed on Nigeria in the wake of the 2011 elections, which targeted churches and Christians specifically, unlike the limited incidences of violence during the previous elections.
IV. Conspicuously absent from the Chief Prosecutor’s findings is any reference whatsoever to the Boko Haram terrorist organization, its declared violent effort to expel out of the North or kill Christians found in the North, and the massive numbers of casualties which have resulted from their declared goals.
Further contributing to the lack of a complete understanding of the situation in Nigeria is the report’s total neglect of any mention of the Islamic extremist group known as the Boko Haram. Calling itself “Jama’atu Ahlussunati Waljama’a Lidda’awiti Waljihad,” this organization poses one of the most potent threats to Nigeria’s unity and safety. This organization’s very name, loosely translated, means “Western education is sinful.” The Boko Haram’s current leader, Imam Abu Muhammad Abubakar Bin. Muhammad Shekau, has stated publicly that “this is a war between The Muslims and The Infidels… it is not an ethnic war, it is not an ignorant war, it is not a war for money, it is not a war for any other reason. No, it is a religious war! This war is not meant to end in either a day, a week, or a year, but the end of this war is when we are all dead the whole of us and none of us is left to continue the war or it is the religion that will dictate what is to be done and this may decipher the end of this war.” He further said, “For me now I proclaim that Nigeria as a nation must be governed by the Shari’a law…”
Since being re-launched in 2002, the Boko Haram has slaughtered thousands of people and wounded hundreds more. It has repeatedly bombed churches and targeted Christians in northern states, although recently, it has begun including the media in its attacks. It launched a series of attacks targeting churches, including during Christmas services in Madalla, killing nearly 35 and wounding over 50, bombing a church in Jos leaving one dead, and taking responsibility for three attacks in northern Yobe state (Damaturu and Gadaka) that left at least 4 people dead on December 25, 2011. In January 2012, Boko Haram bombed eight government buildings in Kano, killing over 250 people.
The Boko Haram has also targeted international victims. In its most blatant attack on the West, the Boko Haram bombed the United Nations headquarters in Abuja on August 26, 2011, killing over twenty people and wounding eighty. Although there have been numerous instances of atrocities and violence committed by the Boko Haram against Christians, Muslims, and animists, one particularly important instance that should certainly have been mentioned in the interim report is the organization’s attack on the United Nation system itself killing innocent international civil servants.
Confirming its genocidal aspirations, the terror group subsequently issued an ultimatum that all Christians must leave the northern states within three days. The violence Boko Haram used to punctuate their deadline date was of a magnitude strong enough to prompt President Goodluck Jonathan to declare a state of emergency in the areas most hit by the violence and ordered part of the country’s borders closed. Restrictions and blockades were erected because of the Boko Haram. Thousands of youths erected roadblocks on the road from the capital to the largely Muslim north.
In light of the extensive violence it has caused, and the widespread public attention the Boko Haram has received, it is a significant oversight that the interim report did not at all acknowledge the Boko Haram’s extremist activities. Omitting any mention of this self-proclaimed Islamic extremist terrorist group in the interim report masks the perpetrators and distorts one major cause of violence and is, therefore, an unacceptable omission.
V. Although the report in paragraph 52 identifies the “particular federal character of the country,” absent from the Chief Prosecutor’s findings is the jurisdictional issue of the sole federal control of police, of security, of jails, and of how States obtain case files for prosecution of such State-based crimes as “culpable homicide.”
The scant prosecution of perpetrators of the violence by federal authorities and the hampering of the states or more accurately a state—Plateau is the only state where Federal authorities preempted local prosecutions—to undertake prosecution has led to a climate of impunity, which we view as a significant contributor to the violence. But the interim report never raises nor addresses the issue of jurisdiction over the on-going trials of perpetrators of some of the incidents or even acknowledge any trials. Most of the suspects of the April 2011 crises have not been prosecuted.
Plateau State is the only state so far that has documented prosecutions. Only one other state has reported prosecutions, which is Bauchi State. Kaduna state has said to Jubilee Campaign that there are prosecutions in progress. Kaduna state is the only one to have both a high profile commission of inquiry of its own and a relief camp arising from the post-election violence of 2011. The panel report is expected soon according to state authorities.
Under a new era of positive cooperation between the federal and the state government, the Plateau Director of Public Prosecution Office is currently prosecuting 315 persons in connection with the Jos crises in state courts as of 1st May 2012. The Federal High Court of Justice of Nigeria in the Jos Judicial Division in Plateau State, by 2011 had tried at least 39 individual suspects under prosecution by the Federal Republic of Nigeria<a  and rendered sentences on seven cases and dismissed five. The Federal High Court trials show 93 persons acquitted, 26 more convictions, and 3 appeals. Cooperation between the Federal Attorney General and the State Attorney General started during the last quarter or 2010 and continues to the present time. A stakeholders and peace builders meeting took place in May 2012 involving representatives of the Fulani, Berom security agencies of the government and the Attorney General of Plateau state.
This relatively high number of prosecutions is despite the difficulties faced by the Jos Division of the Federal High Court of Nigeria when it had to relocate in November 2011. The Nigerian Federal Government’s efforts to apprehend and prosecute the perpetrators of the upsets and violence across the country leave much to be desired. The federal high court in Jos specifically is exerting significant effort to prosecute those responsible for causing breach of the peace and violent attacks.
The crises caused by the Boko Haram and the post-election violence were followed with few to no arrests or trials in many states. The Main Report of the Federal Government Investigation Panel on the 2011 Election Violence and Civil Disturbances reports that only seven of the fifteen states affected by the election violence made any arrests. Such failure to prosecute is a failure of the federal government of Nigeria’s security forces and thus, a failure of the Nigerian federal government itself, not the Plateau State.
The structure of the Nigerian court system being a federal one has a dual regimen for allowing prosecutions to take place. Offenses under the Nigerian Constitution are categorized between federal offences and state offences. This is where the potential conflict of laws begins. Offences under the Constitution that are considered federal offences are offences related to the existence of Nigeria as a sovereign entity. Example of such offences are treasonable felony, sedition, corrosive trafficking, etc. At state level are offences like culpable homicide, murder or manslaughter.
There are clear cases of culpable homicide, and the responsibility to initiate that prosecution is chiefly that of the state attorney general. But in the wake of the Dogo Nahawa Massacre of 2008, the federal government appeared to have a vested interest instead of a national interest. The federal attorney general overreached his office in Abuja to come down to Jos and take over the constitutional functions of the state government.
Almost every lawyer who understands the fundamentality of jurisdiction, with respect to criminal trials, understands that any trial by a court lacking jurisdiction amounts to a nullity. The federal attorney general decided to try those arrested relating to charges for the Dogo Nahawa Massacre in a federal high court, which is basically a revenue court. The federal high court does not have jurisdiction to try culpable homicides. So even if an attorney general were to take a suspect charged with murder before a federal court, that suspect would be charged with perhaps arson or tax fraud, but nothing even remotely close to a homicide charge. 
Also contributing to the problem is the structure of Nigeria’s police and security forces. There are no state police – there are only federal police, security, and military forces. Thus, when a suspect is arrested, he is in the custody of federal police, and his case file is held by the federal courts. No state prosecution can proceed until the federal court hands over the suspect’s case file to the state court.
Despite the foregoing, some prosecutions have begun to take place and for the first time since Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999, incidents of civil unrest have resulted in successful prosecutions. On March 7, 2010, Muslims attacked the village of Dogo Nahawa, killing roughly 500 men, women and children. Of the 164 people arrested, 15 suspects were convicted and sentenced to 10 years in prison in December of that year. Of the cases filed in the Federal High Court in the Jos Judicial Division, the heaviest sentence given was 21 years (for acts of terrorism), and the lightest was one year (for illegal possession of firearms). 
Therefore, in view of the stated objections, we implore the Office of the Prosecutor to reword its interim report so that violence in the twelve northern most states is properly acknowledged; that the primal cause of the on-going violence in the northern states of Nigeria is acknowledged as being religiously-motivated, not ethnic tensions; that the Boko Haram be mentioned as an actor in the on-going violence across the northern states; that the post-election violence be better represented as occurring in the northern states, not the south; and that the issue of federal and state court jurisdiction in Nigeria be addressed and an acknowledgement of the efforts of both the federal and the Plateau State governments in prosecutions be made.
We urge that the ICC preliminary investigation read and review all of the Judicial Inquiry Panels on this issue. These judicial inquiry panel reports are being presented to the ICC by the Attorney General of Plateau State:
- White Paper On the Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry Into the Civil Disturbances in Jose and Its Environs, September 2002.
- Whitepaper on the Report of the Commission of Inquiry Into the Riots of 12th April 1994 in Jos Metropolis September 2004.
- Special inquiry report conducted by Justice Bola Ajibola, Inquiry report released October 27, 2009.
The specific five objections raised pertaining to the Plateau State contradict the analysis of the particular crises and conclusions contained in these particular judicial inquiry panel reports. It is Jubilee Campaign’s position that in light of the fact that the Plateau State has been actively engaged in undertaking judicial inquiries following each significant new outbreak of violence and the fact that the Plateau State is making every effort to bring prosecutions against the perpetrators of the violence without respect to ethnic or religious identity but in a manner consistent with seeking justice and ending impunity, the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC should close the investigation related to Plateau State.
 Forty-one suspects were arrested over the post-election violence in Bauchi State and charged separately with criminal conspiracy, culpable homicide, and mischief by fire and ordered by the Bauchi Chief Magistrate Court to be remanded to prison custody.
Segun Awofadeji, Post Election Violence: Bauchi Court Remands Forty One Suspects, This Day (May 2011),
suspects/91483/ [accessed 10 May 2012].
 Office of the Attorney General of Plateau States has reviewed its records and compiled 315 individual accused who have been under prosecution proceedings.
 Information obtained from personal files of Attorney Gregory Lar, counsel of victims of Dogo Nahawa Massacre
According to information Jubilee Campaign received from the Office of the Attorney General on 8 May 2012.
The Federal High Court in Jos had to relocate to Abuja because of the violence. James Abraham, High Court Relocates to Abuja over Recurrent Crisis, National Mirror ( 11 Feb. 2011),
http://nationalmirroronline.net/news/5547.html [accessed 10 May 2012].
The states of Adamawa, Kano, Kebbi, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe, and Zamfara were the only ones that the Committee was informed had made arrests. No information was provided, however, about whether any of the apprehended persons were prosecuted. And not a single arrest was made in Kaduna, where the number of deaths was the highest of all the states.
 Based on statements given on 8 Mar. 2011 at a public briefing on the anniversary of the March 2010 Massacres in the Jos Crisis, by Barrister Greg Lar, attorney to the March Massacre victims’ families, Christofori Chambers, Abuja.
 On March 7, 2010, over 500 men, women, and children were killed when Muslims attacked the village of Dogo Nahawa.
 Information taken from statements given on 8 Mar. 2011 at a public briefing on the anniversary of the March 2010 Massacres in the Jos Crisis, by Barrister Greg Lar, attorney to the March Massacre victims’ families, Christofori Chambers, Abuja.
Personal files of Barrister Gregory Lar, attorney to the March Massacre victims’ families, Christofori Chambers, Abuja.